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to Mitigate GPS Spoofing Attacks
Junhwan Lee, Ahmad F. Taha, Nikolaos Gatsis, and David Akopian.
Abstract—The operation of critical infrastructures such as
the electrical power grid, cellphone towers, and financial in-
stitutions relies on precise timing provided by stationary GPS
receivers. These GPS devices are vulnerable to a type of spoofing
called Time Synchronization Attack (TSA), whose objective is
to maliciously alter the timing provided by the GPS receiver.
The objective of this paper is to design a tuning-free, low
memory robust estimator to mitigate such spoofing attacks.
The contribution is that the proposed method dispenses with
several limitations found in the existing state-of-the-art methods
in the literature that require parameter tuning, availability of the
statistical distributions of noise, real-time optimization, or heavy
computations. Specifically, we (i) utilize an observer design for
linear systems under unknown inputs, (ii) adjust it to include
a state-correction algorithm, (iii) design a realistic experimental
setup with real GPS data and sensible spoofing attacks, and
(iv) showcase how the proposed tuning-free, low memory robust
estimator can combat TSAs. Numerical tests with real GPS data
demonstrate that accurate time can be provided to the user under
various attack conditions.
Index Terms—Robust state estimation, observer design, GPS
spoofing, time synchronization attacks, low memory estimation.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
THE Global Positioning System (GPS) is widely uti-lized in an abundance of applications. The study [1]
in particular emphasizes how critical infrastructures such as
communications, the power grid, transportation, and even
financial services can be disrupted if the integrity of the GPS
is compromised.
Since most systems rely on non-encrypted civilian GPS
signals [2], the GPS is vulnerable to intentional attacks.
There are two types of deliberate attacks on GPS: jamming
and spoofing [3]. While jamming completely blocks signal
reception by transmitting high power noise, spoofing changes
the transmitted signal or data to deceive the GPS receiver.
Various experiments have shown that different types of spoof-
ing attacks such as data level spoofing, signal level spoofing,
delaying, and record-and-reply attacks [4]–[6] could affect off-
the-shelf GPS receivers.
A Time Synchronization Attack (TSA) is a particular class
of spoofing attacks on stationary GPS receivers that pro-
vide precise timing in various applications, including phasor
measurement units (PMUs), cellphone towers, and financial
institutions [7], [8]. The objective of the attack is to mislead
the time estimated by the receiver which, in the case of the
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power grid for example, can disrupt the reliable monitoring of
the grid’s cyber-physical status.
Countermeasures against spoofing attacks have been pro-
posed in [9]–[11] and include techniques that rely on multiple
GPS receivers [12], [13] or check the magnitude of error
in the GPS data [9]; see [5] for a review of anti-spoofing
techniques. Another approach to mitigate and detect spoofing
TSAs is through robust, dynamic state estimation routines that
are designed to deal with outliers and malicious attacks.
The robust state estimation literature is indeed rich with two
main classes of methods. The first class is based on robust
observers and Lyapunov theory which often does not assume
any statistical distribution for unknown inputs or noise [14],
[15]. The second class is based on Kalman filter and its deriva-
tives, that often assume statistical distribution of noise [16]–
[18]. Relevant to the robust estimation problem under TSAs, a
novel anti-spoofing particle filter is devised to find the receiver
position even under spoofing interference [10]. In our recent
work [11], we develop a real-time optimization method to
detect and mitigate TSAs using weighted `1 minimization.
The aforementioned methods all require either tuning of
some parameters, real-time optimization, or availability of the
statistical distribution of noise.
The objective of this paper is to design a robust state
estimator that combats TSAs while being endowed with the
following properties: (i) It is a tuning-free method that does not
require any training; (ii) it has low memory requirement in the
sense no heavy computations are needed in real-time; and (iii)
the designed tuning-free, low-memory robust estimator can
correctly reconstruct the actual physical state of the receiver
using a realistic testbed. We note here that our objective is
not to develop a generalized theory for robust estimation, but
rather to build on the recent theoretical advancement in this
field and adapt it to the GPS spoofing problem through a
realistic testbed. The robust state estimation method presented
in this paper is an adaptation of the method in [19]. The
motivation for using this estimator is provided in great detail
in the next sections; the paper’s organization is given next.
Section II presents the dynamic modeling of bias and drift
in GPS receivers and showcases how TSA attacks can be
modeled and designed to mislead standard state estimators.
Section III presents a robust state estimator in addition to a
state correction and TSA reconstruction routine. Section IV
concludes the paper with realistic numerical tests on real GPS
data. For reproducibility, the data used in the numerical tests
and the results are all provided through a Github link.
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II. DYNAMIC MODELING UNDER GPS SPOOFING
The primary goal of GPS localization is to accurately
estimate the position, velocity, clock bias, and clock drift of
the receiver in every time step—conventionally referred to as
the position, velocity, and time (PVT) solution.
The position of the GPS receiver (user) in Earth Centered
Earth Fixed coordinates is denoted by pu = [xu, yu, zu]>.
To estimate the receiver’s location and velocity, the GPS
exploits the known location of satellites and the distance
from each satellite to the receiver. Let N denote the num-
ber of fixed satellites visible by the receiver, then pn =
[xn(tn), yn(tn), zn(tn)]
> for n = 1, 2, . . . , N is the satellite
position at the time of transmission tn. Also, we consider
that tR models the arrival time of transmitted signal at the
receiver. The approximate distance between each satellite and
the receiver can be written as ρn = c(tR − tn), where c
is the speed of light and ρn is commonly known as the
pseudorange [20]. The pseudoranges differ from the true
distances because tR and tn are offset by clock biases denoted
by bu and bn. This relationship is established as
tR = t
GPS
R + bu, tn = t
GPS
n + bn (1)
where tGPSR defines the reception time in the absolute GPS
time, while tGPSn is the signal transmission time in GPS time.
Then, if dn represents the true distance from the receiver to
each satellite, it holds that dn = c(tGPSR − tGPSn ) using the
unbiased transmission and reception times. Alternatively, dn
can be expressed by taking the 2-norm of position difference
between the satellite and the receiver, given by dn = ||pn −
pu||2. The following pseudorange equation is generated by
combining the previous two equations for dn [20]
ρn = ‖pn − pu‖2 + c(bu − bn) + ρn (2)
where ρn captures atmospheric effects and receiver noise.
In addition to the pseudoranges, the GPS receiver can also
measure the rate at which the pseudoranges vary over time,
denoted by ρ˙n, and called pseudorange rate. The pseudorange
rates are expressed in terms of the satellite velocities vn and
the user (GPS receiver) velocity vu as
ρ˙n = (vn − vu)> pn − pu‖pn − pu‖ + b˙u + ρ˙n (3)
where b˙u represents the GPS receiver clock drift and ρ˙n is
the noise. In (2) and (3), the unknown PVT variables ()user
position (pu), user velocity (vu), clock bias (bu), and clock
drift (b˙u)] are usually computed using nonlinear weighted least
squares.
The random walk model captures the dynamics relating
variables in (2) and (3) for stationary applications [20]. The
following is the stationary random walk model:
xu[k + 1]
yu[k + 1]
zu[k + 1]
bu[k + 1]
b˙u[k + 1]
 =
 I3×3 03×2
02×3
1 ∆t
0 1


xu[k]
yu[k]
zu[k]
bu[k]
b˙u[k]
+w[k] (4)
where k is the time index; ∆t is the time resolution; and w is
noise in the system. Generally, stand-alone receivers like those
present in PMUs, use the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) to
estimate the PVT solution [20].
Since the receiver is stationary, the position (pu) can be
treated as known constant while the receiver velocity (vu) is
known to be zero. Thus, the only variables to be estimated are
in fact the clock bias and drift, bu[k] and b˙u[k]. Based on (2),
(3) and the dynamic model in (4), the fundamental plant model
is constructed as follows using ρ[k] = [ρ1[k], ..., ρN [k]]> and
ρ˙[k] = [ρ˙1[k], ..., ρ˙N [k]]
>:[
cbu[k + 1]
cb˙u[k + 1]
]
= A
[
cbu[k]
cb˙u[k]
]
+w[k] (5)
[
ρ[k]
ρ˙[k]
]
= C
[
cbu[k]
cb˙u[k]
]
+ cl[k] + [k] (6)
where
A =
[
1 ∆t
0 1
]
, C =
[
1N×1 0N×1
0N×1 1N×1
]
cl[k] =

‖p1[k]− pu[k]‖ − cb1[k]
...
‖pN [k]− pu[k]‖ − cbN [k]
(v1[k]− vu[k])>. p1[k]− pu[k]‖p1[k]− pu[k]‖ − cb˙1[k]
...
(vN [k]− vu[k])>. pN [k]− pu[k]‖pN [k]− pu[k]‖ − cb˙N [k]

and w[k] and [k] represent process/measurement noise; vec-
tor cl[k] is based on the known satellite position, velocity
and clock characteristics—a time-varying, known quantity.
Equations (5) and (6) can be written as
x[k + 1] = Ax[k] +w[k]
y[k] = Cx[k] + cl[k] + [k].
(7)
The state space model (7), however, does not model poten-
tial spoofing attacks. While many different physical spoofing
mechanisms are devised to deceive the victim receiver [6],
time synchronization attack (TSA) is applied on the stationary
GPS receiver. In practical sense, TSA alters the timestamp
estimate by inserting the spoofing signal into the authentic
pseudorange signals:
ρs[k] = ρ[k] + sρ[k], ρ˙s[k] = ρ˙[k] + sρ˙[k].
where sρ[k] and sρ˙[k] denote the spoofing attacks, and ρs[k]
and ρ˙s[k] are the spoofed measurements.
Specifically, there are two different types of TSAs according
to the shape of sρ. While Type I attack injects an abrupt signal,
e.g., sρ[k > α] = 8000 m where α indicates the initial time
of attack, Type II attack modifies the clock bias in gradual
manner manipulated by sρ[k] = sρ[k−1]+sρ˙[k]∆t; see [21].
The actual effect of each type of attack on the clock state is
thoroughly reviewed in [22].
As an example, in order for the spoofing signal to be
considered as intentional attack on a PMU, it has to satisfy
certain conditions. According to the IEEE C37.118 Standard,
the attack has to result in 1% total variation error, which is
equivalent to 26.65 µs clock bias error, or 7989 m of distance
equivalent bias error in order for the attack to be considered
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infringing [23]. These types of spoofing attacks—regardless
of their physical mechanism—impact the state dynamics as
x[k + 1] = Ax[k] + d[k]
where d[k] = [d1[k] d2[k]]> models and lumps TSAs and
any process noise. Concrete examples of TSAs are given in
Section III. In our previous work [11, Section III], we show
how specific forms of d[k] can mislead the receiver.
III. ROBUST STATE ESTIMATOR
In this section, we present a state estimation algorithm that
is endowed with the following properties: (i) It is a tuning-
free method that does not require any knowledge of noise
distribution, initial parameters or states, or other coefficients;
(ii) it has low memory requirements in the sense no heavy
computations are needed which is befitting to devices with
limited computational power and limited internet connectivity;
(iii) it is robust to GPS spoofing, time-synchronization attacks.
A. GPS Clock Model and Estimator Dynamics
The plant model under the spoofing attack based on the
previous can be written as
x[k + 1] =Ax[k] + d[k]
y[k] =Cx[k] + cl[k] + [k]
(8)
where x[k] ∈ R2 represents the state vector of clock bias and
drift at time k; y[k] ∈ R2N represents a single column vector
of pseudoranges and pseudorange rates where N indicates the
fixed number of visible satellites at every time index; d[k] ∈
R2 is the unknown spoofing attack applied to the bias and drift
which also includes process noise; state-space matrices A, C,
cl are discussed in the previous section.
Consider now a new modified state vector xm[k] ∈ R2
which represents the state vector without spoofing attack and
follows the following dynamics:
xm[k + 1] = x[k + 1]− d[k] = Ax[k]. (9)
The left-hand side of (9) essentially represents the original
state vector considering that the spoofing attack d[k] is re-
moved. The modified state vector xm[k] propagates through
to y[k]. This yields:
xm[k + 1] =Axm[k] +Ad[k − 1]
y[k] =Cxm[k] + cl[k] +Cd[k − 1].
(10)
The presented state estimator in this paper is an adaptation of
the observer from [19] and follows the difference equation:
ROBUSTESTIMATOR
xˆm[k + 1] =Axˆm[k] +Adˆ[k − 1] +L1(y[k]− yˆ[k])
yˆ[k] =Cxˆm[k] + cl[k] +Cdˆ[k − 1]
e[k] =y[k]− yˆ[k]
dˆ[k] =dˆ[k − 1] +L2C>e[k] (11)
where xˆm[k] ∈ R2 is a state estimate of corrected state
vector xm[k] at time k; yˆ[k] ∈ R2N is the estimate vector
of observation y[k]; dˆ[k] is an estimate of the spoofing attack
d[k]. We note here that dˆ[−1], xˆm[0], and yˆ[0] should be
initialized before iteration starts at k = 0 with arbitrary
initial conditions. Matrices L1 ∈ R2×2N and L2 ∈ R2×2
are optimization variables where L1 is akin, in principle, to a
Luenberger gain that is designed here to ensure robustness of
the state estimation to spoofing attacks.
B. Design of Robust Gains L1,2
The design of the robust estimator gains L1,2 is based on
linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). Simply put, the objective
of the designed observer is to guarantee asymptotically stable
estimation error dynamics. That is, matrices L1 and L2 are
designed to guarantee that limk→∞ e[k] = 0 under non-
zero spoofing attack d[k] and bounded estimation error un-
der spoofing attacks. The ROBUSTESTIMATOR variables are
designed via solving this low-dimensional feasibility problem
with one linear matrix inequality (LMI), given as follows:
ESTIMATORDESIGN
find G ∈ R2×2N ,P ∈ R2×2,Q ∈ R2N×2N ,M ∈ R2×2
s.t.

P ? ? ?
0 Q ? ?
GC − PA GC − PA P ?
MC>C MC>C −Q 0 Q
  0 (12a)
{P ,Q,M} = {P>,Q>,M>}  0, (12b)
where the symbol ? is used to represent symmetric components
in symmetric block matrices. After solving (12) for positive
definite matrix variables P ,Q, and M , and real matrix
variable G, the observer gains are computed as follows
L1 = P
−1G, L2 = MQ−1. (13)
As mentioned earlier, the state estimator design is derived
from [19]; the reader is referred to that paper for the derivation
of the above LMIs. Note that no tuning is required to solve
ESTIMATORDESIGN, and this LMI can be solved analytically
via evaluating the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for feasi-
bility [24]. Furthermore, any convex optimization toolbox or
LMI solver can be used to solve (12). These include Matlab’s
LMI solver, CVX [25], and Yalmip [26].
We note the following. First, the necessary conditions for
existence of L1,2 are standard. These conditions are (a) the
detectability of (A,C); (b) the classical rank matching condi-
tion stating that rank(CBd) = rank(Bd) where Bd = I2
is the matrix coefficient of d[k] in (8); and (c) bounded
variations of the unknown spoofing signal d[k]. Second, this
robust estimator not only estimates x[k], but also the spoofing
attack d[k]. This is instrumental in mitigating and correcting
the attack. The next section showcases the design of the gain
matrices.
C. State Correction Algorithm under Spoofing
Upon solving the LMIs and running the ROBUSTESTI-
MATOR from any arbitrary initial conditions, the estimator is
guaranteed theoretically to produce bounded estimation error
e[k], thereby estimating the then-spoofed bias and drift, and
reconstructing the spoofing attack dˆ[k]. With that in mind,
this does not indicate that the bias and drift are correctly
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Algorithm 1: Robust Bias and Drift Estimation
1 input: Number of satellites N , matrices A and C
2 initialize: dˆ[−1], xˆm[0], yˆ[0]
3 Offline Computations
4 Compute G,P,Q,M given A and C by solving (12)
5 Obtain L1 and L2 from (13)
6 Online Computations
7 while k ≥ 0 do
8 Obtain cl[k] from satellite measurements
9 Run (11) and obtain xˆm[k + 1] and dˆ[k]
10 Perform spoofing attack correction (15)
11 Perform state and output correction (16)
12 k ← k + 1
13 output: Attack-free xˆc[k], TSA estimates dˆc[k]
estimated seeing that spoofing attack had already changed the
state through the state propagation and difference equation. To
that end, this section develops a state correction algorithm to
recover the authentic bias and drift values in real-time.
To that end, the dynamics (9) can be written as
xm[k + 1] = Axm[k] +Ad[k − 1]
= A(Axm[k − 1] +Ad[k − 2]) +Ad[k − 1]. (14)
This relationship reveals that current spoofing during one
time instant comprises the cumulative attacks from the pre-
vious time steps. Consequently, the disturbance estimate dˆ is
not sufficient enough to correct the attacked states. Rather, a
new disturbance estimate vector dc is formulated to account
for the accumulated disturbances. Considering the estimate of
spoofing attacks dˆ[k] =
[
dˆ1[k] dˆ2[k]
]>
computed by (11),
we propose estimating the new disturbance estimate vector dc
via
dˆc[k] =

k∑
l=1
dˆ1[l] +
k−1∑
l=1
(k − l)dˆ2[l]
k−1∑
l=1
dˆ2[l]
 (15)
This equation acknowledges the fact that estimated state xm
is still contaminated by the attack from the past time step.
Therefore, the corrected state xc and authentic observation
state yc could be retrieved by subtracting dˆc from xm and yˆ
as follows:
xˆc[k] = xˆm[k]− dˆc[k], yˆc[k] = yˆ[k]−Cdˆc[k] (16)
Algorithm 1 showcases the overall problem design, robust
state estimation, and the reconstruction of the corrected bias
and drift of the GPS receiver. The algorithm takes as inputs:
the fixed number of satellites N , A and C, and satellites
data which is encoded through cl[k]. The algorithm is divided
into two stages—an offline stage and an online one. In the
offline stage, the ROBUSTESTIMATOR gains L1 and L2 are
computed via solving (11) and evaluating (13). The online
stage includes running the ROBUSTESTIMATOR (11) and
the cumulative corrections for the states and spoofing attacks.
The algorithm returns the attack-free, yet still slightly noisy
TABLE I
VECTOR NOMENCLATURE.
Notation Description
xGT ground truth state vector
xEKF estimated state vector from EKF
xLuen estimated state vector from Luenberger Observer
xˆm modified state vector estimates
xˆc corrected state vector via (16)
d attack vector vector applied to x
dˆc corrected spoofing attack vector via (15)
estimates of the bias and drift xˆc[k] and an estimate of the
actual spoofing attack dˆc[k].
It is noteworthy to mention the following. First, the offline
component of the algorithm—albeit offline—can be solved
analytically seeing that the problem dimension is very small,
when considering that only few satellite measurements are
needed. Second, the algorithm and the LMI feasibility problem
both only require a fixed number of satellites, rather than a
fixed satellite combination. This is important considering that
different satellites are visible each time. In short, the proposed
algorithm in this paper only assumes a minimum fixed number
of satellites N , where these N satellites can be changing in
real time without impacting the algorithm or the design of the
robust estimator.
Third, Algorithm 1 works for any reasonable initial condi-
tions, that is, the estimation should converge regardless of the
initial conditions choice. Fourth, this method is truly tuning-
free: no prior knowledge of the statistical distribution of noise,
or prior knowledge or tuning of any parameters is needed. The
algorithm is also low-memory, as the only computation needed
to be performed online is running the ROBUSTESTIMATOR
and the correction models—both require a small number of
matrix-vector multiplications. This implies that the proposed
algorithm can be implemented in low-memory devices without
the need for any intensive computational effort or internet
connectivity. Finally, we note that the proposed algorithm has
no stopping criterion seeing that it runs in real time.
IV. CASE STUDIES: A REALISTIC TESTBED
This section discusses the detection and mitigation
of TSAs via various approaches. First, the experimental
procedure is discussed. Then, we compare the performance
of the extended Kalman filter (EKF)—which has long been
used in the literature [20] as a ground truth for estimating the
bias and drift—and the classical Luenberger observer under
spoofing attacks. Then, the performance of the proposed
robust estimator under TSAs is showcased, followed by
thorough comparison of the performance of the approaches.
The following link includes all codes and data used to
generate the results, including the acquired GPS data:
github.com/junhwanlee95/Robust-Estimator.
Table I summarizes the important vector nomenclature.
A. Setup: Model Simulation & Obtaining Raw GPS Data
A Google Nexus 9 tablet, which has an embedded GPS
chipset, is used to collect real GPS signals, which are recorded
on November 4, 2018 at the University of Texas at San
Antonio main campus. The data are available for the reader
through the aforementioned Github link. While the receiver
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acquires the signal, the device remained still to simulate the
stationary scenario. Raw GPS data is post-processed to obtain
pseudorange and pseudorange rate data by GNSS Logger, the
Android application released by the Google Android location
team [27]. Then, Type I and II attacks are injected into the
pseudorange and pseudorange rate data to simulate spoofing
as discussed in Section II and shown in [11, Section III]. The
initial conditions for the robust estimator are chosen to be
different than the actual, ground truth conditions.
B. EKF and Luenberger Performances Under Attacks
Here, we are interested in testing whether the EKF and
the classical Luenberger observer [28] can withstand TSAs
of Type I and II. After Type I and II attacks are applied from
t = 30 s to t = 400 s, the performance of the EKF and
Luenberger observer—which does not assume any statistical
distribution about the noise—are shown in Fig. 1 and 2.
While the ground truth clock bias and drift, xGT, are ac-
quired through EKF by processing the authentic pseudorange
data, the xEKF bias and drift are generated by applying the
EKF to the spoofed pseudoranges. Another comparison to
xGT is offered by the Luenberger observer estimate xLuen
produced after designing the observer gain L1 such that
the closed loop system eigenvalues are at 0.5 and 0.7. The
performances of EKF and Luenberger observer are shown
respectively in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. It is evident that both
approaches fail to estimate the correct states in the presence
of the attack.
C. Robust Estimator Performance under Type I/II TSAs
In this section, we test the proposed robust estimator and
run Algorithm 1 which contains an offline stage and an online
one. First, we set N = 4, i.e., we choose to sample data
from only four satellites. We solve the LMIs (12) for the
estimator gains. Using these estimator gains, the online portion
of Algorithm 1 is run. Pertaining to Type I attack, Fig. 3
showcases the performance of ROBUSTESTIMATOR. Due to
the attack at t = 30 s, the xˆc clock estimates are initially not
correct, but the clock bias and drift approach the respective
ground truth values within approximately 3 and 11 seconds
(cf. Fig. 3(a) and 3(b) respectively).
Under the same condition and procedure, Algorithm 1 is
applied on Type II attack to detect and correct the spoofed
states. The results of obtaining the corrected state xˆc are shown
in Fig. 4. In order to accurately depict the performance of RO-
BUSTESTIMATOR, the relative estimation error is calculated
as |xˆc−xGT|xGT for each of the two states in x over time. The
resulting graphs are shown in Fig. 5. Comparison between xˆc
and the xGT reveals that the maximum error between the two
biases is 952.09 m or 3.17 µs. It is thus demonstrated that
the Robust Estimator of Algorithm 1 successfully detects and
corrects the Type II attack.
In the interest of gauging the performance of each approach,
the root mean square error (RMSE) of the estimated clock bias
is calculated under both attack types. Let K denote the total
length of observation time (K = 400 in this experiment). The
RMSE is defined as RMSE =
√
1
K
∑K−1
k=0 (cbˆu[k]− cbˇu[k])2
0 100 200 300 400
Time(s)
(a)
-4
-2
0
104
0 100 200 300 400
Time(s)
(b)
-10000
-5000
0
Fig. 1. Comparison of ground truth, EKF and Luenberger observer estimates
under Type I attack: (a) clock bias; (b) clock drift.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of ground truth, EKF and Luenberger observer estimates
under Type II attack: (a) clock bias; (b) clock drift.
where cbˇu[k] is the ground truth clock bias under normal
conditions, and cbˆu[k] equals to the estimated clock bias
value from each approach. Under Type II attack, the RMSE
for EKF and the Luenberger observer are RMSEEKF =
74344 m and RMSELuenberger = 74433 m respectively,
while that of the robust estimator is RMSERobustEstimator =
354.9 m. As for Type I attack, the RMSEs are as follows:
RMSEEKF = 8477.3 m, RMSELuenberger = 8104.9 m, and
RMSERobustEstimator = 1029 m. This illustrates the perfor-
mance of this tuning-free, low-memory robust estimator in
detecting spoofing attacks, while correctly reconstructing the
bias and drift states of the GPS receiver.
V. PAPER SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, the design and realistic application of a low-
memory, real-time ROBUSTESTIMATOR is studied. Utilizing
the GPS receiver on a Google Nexus 9, real GPS data are
collected and post-processed by injecting time-synchronization
attacks to spoof the clock bias and drift of the device. Two
types of attacks are introduced, and tested by the designed
estimator. The estimator successfully detects and estimates the
spoofing attacks on each state, and mitigates the spoofing on
both types of attack by furnishing the corrected clock states to
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Fig. 3. Comparison of ground truth and corrected state through the correc-
tion (16) under Type I attack: (a) clock bias; (b) clock drift.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of ground truth and corrected state through the correc-
tion (16) under Type II attack: (a) clock bias; (b) clock drift.
the user. Future work will focus on developing robust estima-
tors under spoofing attacks for non-stationary GPS receivers,
which involve nonlinearities in the GPS measurement model.
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